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Abstract:  The article aims to identify dependencies between the central bank’s interest 
rate and GDP dynamics in selected economies and to highlight the risks of a zero 
bound interest rate policy for an economy. The hypothesis that the main interest rates 
and GDP dynamics in the euro area, USA and Poland are statistically significantly 
related to each other was confirmed. The purpose of the article was accomplished 
using the following methods: a review of the scientific literature, the presentation of 
pertinent statistical data and statistical analysis. Its findings imply that although a low 
cost of money can stimulate a country’s economy, prolonged periods of zero bound 
interest rates can be a threat to economic expansion. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The years of the Great Depression in the 1930s were a period of 
severe deflation. In many countries where deflation has occurred 
despite the nominal interest rate having been reduced to almost 
zero economic activity slackened.1  At the same time, though, in 
many countries deflation has not been accompanied by a lower 
rate of GDP growth. For instance, in 2002, deflation did not 
prevent the Chinese rate of GDP growth from reaching 8%.2 
This said, it must be noticed that the literature provides more 
evidence that low interest rates have a negative effect on national 
economies. It is also noteworthy that interest rates have a major 
influence on the rate of economic growth and that the influence 
is negative when they are either too high or too low. 
 
2 Deflation, zero bound interest rates and an economy 
 
Economies in deflation have to pay many costs, one of which 
arises from the “explosion” of bad debts that takes place when 
some debtors have to spend a higher percentage of their income 
to service debt liabilities when the amount of loan instalments 
does not change while their income (in monetary terms) 
decreases as prices fall.3 A major threat related to a zero bound 
interest rate is the risk of collapse of the financial sector, because 
easily available loans are frequently spent on assets, which 
consequently drives their prices upward and thereby the value of 
collaterals.4 A prolonged period of low interest rates can lead to 
the emergence of a speculative bubble in the assets market, the 
bursting of which can destabilize the financial sector.5 
Economists hold different views on how a central bank should 
respond to the emergence or bursting of such bubbles. Some 
argue that because central banks cannot recognize that a market 
bubble is being formed, they should focus on offsetting their 
impacts. A relevant example is the situation from before the 
most recent financial crisis, when the major central banks 
believed that pursuing a zero bound interest rate policy was right 
even at the risk of deflation.6 From 2002 to 2006, the US interest 
rate was some 2.5% lower than that recommended by the Taylor 
rule7 (in Taylor’s opinion, the US monetary policy in the pre-
crisis years was either not restrictive enough or too loose). This 
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departure from the Taylor rule lasted longer than in the 1970s. 
The Fed explained this extraordinary reduction of interest rates 
as an intended abandonment of conventional monetary policy 
rules in order to enable a discretionary intervention against 
deflation (such as that observed in Japan in the 1990s).8 The 
formulas below represent the original Taylor rule and its version 
with parameters calibrated for the USA. The first of the formulas 
is the following: 
 
 
 
where,  = the nominal federal funds rate in period t,   = the 
annual rate of inflation in period t (%),  = inflation target in 
period t (%),  = GDP gap (demand) in period t (GDP 
deviation from its potential  level,  %),  = the  real  interest  
rate  corresponding  to  full  employment  (natural  interest rate), 
,  = structural parameters.  
The calibrated formula reads as follows:9  
 
 
 
Baranowski noted that the Taylor rule offered a guideline for 
monetary policy. As well as facilitating the forecasting of 
interest rates, the rate is also an important element of theoretical 
and empirical models of the national economy.10 
 
Another threat arising from a zero bound interest rate policy is 
that low interest rates can make risky projects appealing to 
banks. For instance, interest rate reductions in the US increased 
the risk of loans, because banks started to lend at lower prices 
and to borrowers of questionable creditworthiness.11 Researchers 
studying Spanish loan records spanning a period of 23 years 
made a similar observation. They noted that interest rate 
reductions were followed by an increasing amount of loans 
granted to borrowers that either had a bad borrowing history or 
did not have such history at all. Their conclusion was that the 
credit risk increases with an extending period of low interest 
rates.12 Having analysed the impacts of interest rates staying low 
for a long time after the financial crisis, Rzonca concluded that 
the maintenance of zero bound interest rates was harmful to 
economic growth.13 Nevertheless, some economists believe that 
the quantitative easing policy should be continued, because the 
world economy may plunge into another crisis unless banks 
continue to support economic growth with low interest rates. 
 
3 Analysis of dependencies between central banks’ interest 
rates and the rate of economic growth in USA, the euro area 
and Poland 
 
This section presents statistical data on the main interest rates, 
inflation and GDP dynamics in the USA, the euro zone and 
Poland, as well as the results of regression analysis of the rates’ 
influence on GDP dynamics in these economies. 
Table 1 shows the levels of the main interest rates set by the 
central banks in the euro area (the main refinancing operation 
rate), the USA (the federal funds rate) and Poland (the reference 
rate) between 1999 and 2016. Because the rates were frequently 
changed over a year, the table presents their annual arithmetic 
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means, excluding the US interest rates in the period 2009-2016 
that are shown as bands. 
 
Table 1 Main interest rates of central banks in euro area, USA 
and in Poland 
Year Main refinancing operation rate ECB 
Federal funds rate 
USA 
Reference rate 
NBP 
1999 2,90 5,25 14,50 
2000 4,04 6,08 18,25 
2001 3,94 3,73 14,43 
2002 2,75 1,25 8,28 
2003 2,25 1,00 5,88 
2004 2,00 1,75 6,08 
2005 2,25 3,38 5,15 
2006 3,00 4,88 4,13 
2007 3,88 4,50 4,63 
2008 3,44 1,93 5,54 
2009 1,44 0-0,25 3,88 
2010 1,00 0-0,25 3,50 
2011 1,25 0-0,25 4,13 
2012 0,75 0-0,25 4,50 
2013 0,38 0-0,25 3,21 
2014 0,10 0-0,25 2,00 
2015 0,05 0,25-0,50 1,50 
2016 0,00 0,25-0,50 1,5 
 
The long-term interest rates were low over the analysed years, 
especially in the euro area and the USA. The Polish interest rates 
are now at their historic low level, but at the end of the 20th c. 
and in the early 21st c., they were much higher than in the euro 
area and the USA. 
 
Table 2 shows the 1999-2015 economic growth rates for the euro 
area, USA and Poland. The growth dynamics of GDP was the 
lowest in the euro area, somewhat higher in the USA, and the 
highest in Poland. It needs to be noted, however, that Poland is 
counted among the “catching-up” countries (emerging markets) 
where GDP growth is typically higher than in developed 
economies. 
 
Table 2  GDP growth in Euro Area, USA and in Poland 
Year GDP growth rate in Eurozone 
GDP growth rate in 
USA 
GDP growth 
rate in Poland 
1999 3 4,69 4,6 
2000 3,8 4,09 4,3 
2001 2,1 0,98 1,2 
2002 0,9 1,79 1,4 
2003 0,6 2,81 3,9 
2004 2,3 3,79 5,3 
2005 1,6 3,35 3,6 
2006 3,2 2,67 6,2 
2007 2,9 1,78 6,8 
2008 0,4 -0,29 5,1 
2009 -4,4 -2,78 1,6 
2010 2,1 2,53 3,9 
2011 1,5 1,60 4,5 
2012 -0,9 2,22 2 
2013 -0,3 1,49 1,6 
2014 1,1 2,43 3,3 
2015 2 2,43 3,6 
 
Table 3 contains annual inflation rates for the euro area, USA 
and Poland in the same period. The rates were low in both the 
euro area and the USA. The Polish inflation rate was high in the 
years 1999-2001 but in 2002, it abruptly dropped below 2% to 
rise above 4% in 2004. An inflation rate of 0.7% or less was not 
noted in Poland until 2013 (except of 2005). The years 2014-
2015 were a period of deflation.  
 
Table 3 Inflation in Euro Area, USA and in Poland 
Year Inflation  in Eurozone Inflation  in USA Inflation  in Poland 
1999 2,2 1,1 7,30 
2000 3,4 2,1 8,50 
2001 2,8 2,3 3,60 
2002 1,6 2,2 0,80 
2003 2,3 2,1 1,70 
2004 2,7 2,1 4,40 
2005 3,4 2,2 0,70 
2006 3,2 2,2 1,40 
2007 2,9 2,1 4,00 
2008 3,8 3,3 3,30 
2009 -0,4 0,3 3,50 
2010 1,6 1,6 3,10 
2011 3,2 2,7 4,60 
2012 2,1 2,5 2,40 
2013 1,5 1,4 0,70 
2014 1,6 0,4 -1,00 
2015 0,1 0,0 -0,50 
 
Below, a regression analysis of the selected variables is 
presented. It aimed to find out which dependencies between 
central banks’ main interest rates and GDP dynamics in the three 
selected areas were statistically significant in the years 1999-
2015 and to test a null hypothesis H0 (the variables’ parameters 
are not significant) and an alternative hypothesis H1 (the 
parameters are significant). The variables were checked for 
stationarity with the use of the ADF test (the Dickey–Fuller test). 
The necessary data were obtained from the Eurostat, World 
Bank and Polish Statistical Office websites.14 
 
Table 4 contains the regression results for the USA. The 
independent variables were the nominal federal funds rate 
[FEDF_USA] and the nominal federal funds rate lagged by one 
year [FEDF_USA_1]; the dependent variable was GDP 
dynamics in the USA  [GDP_USA]. 
 
Table 4 The dependent variable (Y): GDP_USA; independent 
variables (X) – FEDF_USA and FEDF_USA_1 
Variable name Coefficient Standard error t- Student p-value 
Const 
 1,88835 0,458773 4,116 
 
0,0012*** 
FEDF_USA 0,968802 0,263448 3,677 0,0028*** 
FEDF_USA_1 −0,819561 0,247387 −3,313 0,0056*** 
Selected regression statistics and analysis of variance:  
2000-2015 observations (N = 16)) 
R-square 0,517774 
F(2, 13) 6,979167   p-value for F test 0,008732 
 
The data in the table point out that the nominal federal funds rate 
and the federal funds rate lagged by one year had a significant 
effect on GDP dynamics in the sampled years. This conclusion is 
based on Student’s t- statistics of 3.677 and -3.313, respectively, 
and on the probabilities of obtaining them (0.0028 < p=0.05 and 
0.0056 < p=0.05) that allow rejecting the null hypothesis H0 in 
favour of the alternative hypothesis H1.  There is a 95% 
probability that between 1999 and 2015 both these rates and 
GDP dynamics in the USA were statistically significantly related 
to each other. The value of the coefficient in table 4 is negative 
(−0.819561) only for the second rate, meaning that the influence 
of interest rates on GDP dynamics in the USA is consistent with 
economic theory. Further, the coefficient for the nominal federal 
funds rate is positive (0.968802), indicating that the GDP growth 
rate in the USA increases as the Fed raises the federal funds rate. 
Table 5 shows the regression results for the euro area. In this 
case, the independent variables were the ECB’s main refinancing 
operation rate [REF_ECB] and the ECB’s main refinancing 
operation rate lagged by one year [REF_ECB_1]; the dependent 
variable was GDP dynamics in the euro area [GDP_ECB]. 
 
Table 5 The dependent variable (Y): GDP_ECB; independent 
variables (X) – REF_ECB and REF_ECB_1 
Variable name Coefficient Standard error t- Student p-value 
Const 1,30129 0,540457 2,408 0,0316** 
REF_ECB 2,20292 0,363609 6,058 4,04e-05*** 
REF_ECB_1 −2,07964 0,389467 −5,340 0,0001*** 
Selected regression statistics and analysis of variance:   
2000-2015 observations (N = 16) 
R-square 0,739698 
F(2, 13) 18,47099   p-value for F test  0,000159 
 
An analysis of the data in table 5 leads to a conclusion that the 
ECB’s nominal interest rate and the nominal interest rate lagged 
by one year rate had a statistically significant influence on GDP 
dynamics in the euro area. A proof of this is Student’s t-statistics 
of 6.058 and -5.340, respectively, and the probabilities of 
obtaining them (4.04e-05 < p=0.05 and 0.0001 < p=0.05) that 
allow rejecting the null hypothesis H0 in favour of the alternative 
hypothesis H1. There is a 95% probability that in the period 
under consideration both these rates were statistically 
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significantly related to GDP dynamics in the euro area. As in the 
previous case, the coefficient is negative (−2.07964) only for the 
ECB’s main rate lagged by one year, implying, again, that the 
effect of interest rates on GDP dynamics in the euro area was 
consistent with economic theory. The positive value of the 
coefficient for the ECB’s nominal interest rate (2.20292) 
indicates that the raising of interest rates by the ECB stimulates 
GDP growth. 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results for Poland. The 
independent variables in the analysis were the NBP’s reference 
rate [REF_NBP] and the NBP’s reference rate lagged by one 
year [REF_NBP_1]; the dependent variable was the dynamics of 
Polish GDP [GDP_POL]. 
 
Table 6 The dependent variable (Y): GDP_POL; independent 
variables (X) – REF_NBP and REF_NBP_1 
Variable 
name Coefficient 
Standard 
error t- Student p-value 
Const 4,46671 0,667096 6,696 1,48e-05 *** 
REF_NBP 0,386282 0,189698 2,036 0,0626 * 
REF_NBP_1 −0,461657 0,177164 −2,606 0,0218 ** 
Selected regression statistics and analysis of variance:  
2000-2015 observations (N = 16) 
R-square 0,355107 
F(2, 13) 3,579188   p-value for F test  0,057766 
 
The above data indicate that both independent variables 
significantly influenced the dynamics of the country’s GDP in 
the analysed period. This conclusion can be drawn from Student 
t-statistics of 2.036 and −2.606, respectively, and from the 
probabilities of obtaining them (0.0626  < p=0.1 and 0.0218 < 
p=0.05) that allow rejecting the null hypothesis H0 in favour of 
the alternative hypothesis H1. There is a 95% probability that in 
the analysed years the relationship between NBP’s reference rate 
and the reference rate lagged by one year, on the one hand, and 
the dynamics of Poland’s GDP, on the other, was statistically 
significant. The negative value of the coefficient (−0.461657) for 
the first rate indicates that the relationship was consistent with 
economic theory again. The coefficient for the second rate is 
positive (0.386282), meaning that the Polish GDP increased 
following rises in the NBP’s reference rate.  
 
The results of the analysis indicate that in the sampled years the 
dependencies between central banks’ main interest rates and 
GDP dynamics were statistically significant in the USA, the euro 
area and Poland. As monetary policy plays a significant role in 
economies, central banks need to be watched carefully for 
changes in their interest rates. 
 
4 Conclusions 
Economic policy makers take interest in deflation only when 
inflation rates fall substantially and the short-term interest rates 
are reduced. The maintenance of near-zero nominal interest rates 
frequently prevents the use of measures counteracting 
deflationary shocks that affect price levels and production. The 
purpose of this article has been to highlight that there are 
significant relationships between central banks` main interest 
rate in the USA, the euro area and Poland and the rate of 
economic growth in these regions. As regards the consequences 
of these relationships, both interest rates that are too low or too 
high can have a negative effect on an economy. 
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